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Abstract:  
 
The present paper provides a framework of takeover defenses in the United Kingdom and 
analyzes the role of takeover defenses in the UK that has implemented the EU Takeover 
Directive in its jurisdiction.  
 
There is an analysis of UK hostile takeovers and takeover defenses regulation, along with the 
case law that formulated it. There is a presentation of takeover defenses involving frustrating 
actions, such as restructuring defenses, target repurchases, litigation, as well as defensive 
actions, including strategies such as the defense document strategy, lobbying, seeking 
alternative bids, profit forecasts. 
 
The analysis of takeover defenses in cases of hostile takeovers in the UK market aims to 
enhance the understanding of their application framework and to provide further insight on 
the way the structure of the economy influences takeover defenses and vice-versa.  
 
It, also, intends to provide feedback for the assessment of economic processes on potential 
restructuring and normalization in the UK as well as the EU, especially in the light of Brexit 
that will likely create extensive negotiations on future policy implementation both in the UK 
and EU.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Takeovers could be divided into two categories; friendly and hostile. In the case of 
hostile takeovers, the target board employs certain defenses, called takeover defenses, 
in order to obstruct the hostile takeover that may be implemented either before or after 
the announcement of the takeover bid. 
 
The analysis of takeover defenses employed in hostile takeovers in the present article 
will be categorized in frustrating and defensive actions. The former involves acts 
obtained by the board that result to a material corruption of the decision-making 
process or to the deprivation of the right of shareholders to decide on the matter 
(Ogowewo, 1997).  
 
However, there is the ‘no frustration’ rule that prevents the board from acquiring such 
defenses. The only instance where the board is permitted to use frustrating acts is when 
the target shareholders or the panel has given its approval for the use of such defenses, 
meaning that it has rejected the takeover offer (Kraakman, 2009) or when the actions 
frustrate only the bidder and not the target shareholders. Defensive actions on the other 
hand, involve acts that board is permitted to employ to influence the target shareholder 
with the aim to obstruct the takeover bid. 
 
2. UK Takeover Regulation 
 
The European Takeover Directive 2004 (Directive 2004/25/EC), which provides for 
the regulation of takeovers in the European Union, defines a ‘takeover bid’ as “a 
public offer…made to the holders of the securities of a company to acquire all or some 
of those securities…which follows or has as its objective the acquisition of control of 
the offer company in accordance with national law” (Article 2(1)(a) Takeover 
Directive 2004). 
 
The 2004 Directive has been implemented in the UK with the UK Takeover Code via 
the Companies Act 2006. The UK Takeover Code involves the regulation of 
takeovers, as well as takeover defenses in the UK which are the focus of this paper. 
Rule 21.1 of the UK Takeover Code sets the framework for frustrating actions which 
are taken after the announcement of a takeover offer is made public or when the offer 
is imminent and are not permitted without the approval of the shareholders. The UK 
Takeover Code also, regulates defensive actions taken by the board, which can be 
employed in order to obstruct a takeover bid. 
 
3. Frustrating Actions 
 
3.1. Rule 21 UK takeover code 
 
According to Rule 21.1, the board of directors of the target company is not allowed 
without prior shareholder approval to employ defenses that can frustrate the takeover 
Isidora Tachmatzidi 
 
107 
 
bid or deprive from the target shareholders their right to decide in relation to the merits 
of the bid. It is the ‘no frustration rule’ or ‘neutrality rule’ and is supported also, by 
General Principle 3 of the UK Takeover Code that states that target shareholders have 
the right to decide on the merits of a takeover offer. The triggering point for the 
adoption of defenses is when there is evidence to believe that a takeover offer is 
imminent or after the announcement of the bid. 
 
There are also, limited circumstances in which approval could be given by the panel. 
These limited circumstances are found in Rule 21.1 of the UK Takeover Code, where 
it is stated that if there is a doubt as to whether a takeover defense falls within Rule 
21.1 prohibition, the Panel should give advice on the matter beforehand. Moreover, 
advice should be given by the Panel in the situations referred to in Rule 21.1. A) and 
B). The former, i.e. Rule 21.1(A), refers to takeover actions that involve a contract 
which had been entered earlier or a ‘pre-existing obligation’. The latter i.e. Rule 
21.1(B), involves a decision to employ a specific takeover action which had been 
taken before the period mentioned in Rule 21.1(A). This action was either completed 
fully or partially before the period in Rule 21.1(A) or was not completed but is part of 
ordinary course of business. In the circumstances, the Panel should give its own 
approval without requiring consent from the shareholders in a shareholder meeting. 
 
Rule 21.1(a)-(b) provides a non-exhaustive list of takeover defenses that the board of 
directors is not allowed to use without the permission of the shareholders. In 
particular, Rule 21.1(a) prohibits defenses that will frustrate a possible takeover offer, 
or an offer already made by a bidder, as well as any actions that will not give 
shareholders the opportunity to decide on the merits. Rule 21.1(b) prevents more 
particular type of actions that cannot be taken if the shareholders have not given their 
approval. Rule 21.1(b)(i) prohibits the board from issuing, transferring, selling or 
purchasing any shares, including shares of the company, (ii) contains the same rules 
but for unissued shares, (iii) prevents the creation or issuing of securities that could be 
converted later into shares, (iv) forbids the sale, acquirement or disposal of a material 
amount of the target company’s assets, and (v) does not allow the board to enter into 
contracts that are outside of the ordinary course of business. Also, the Notes on Rule 
21.1 of the UK Takeover Code provide further guidance in relation to the prohibitions 
on takeover defenses. Therefore, under UK law the target board of directors is not 
permitted to take any defenses that would frustrate a takeover offer if the shareholders 
or the panel has not given approval beforehand.  
 
A landmark decision is Kraft – Cadbury case (Case No COMP/M.5644), which 
resulted in the acquisition of Cadbury by Kraft and led to a lot of criticism that UK 
Takeover law permits a high chance of hostile takeovers to succeed. As a result, the 
UK Takeover Panel prepared a consultation report which was later implemented into 
reforms in the Takeover Code in September 2011. The reforms had as their primary 
aim the enhancement of powers of the target company when faced with a takeover 
offer (Clerc, 2012). Additionally, the reforms included the ability of the target board 
to offer its view on the takeover bid and it should receive impartial advice when 
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deciding. More disclosure was also, considered as an additional element in the reform 
process. Although the Kraft – Cadbury case was heavily involved in the political 
background, it resulted in the aforementioned important changes to the UK takeover 
law. 
 
3.2. Restructuring defenses and target repurchases framework 
 
Restructuring defenses (changes to the assets of the company) are takeover defenses 
used to frustrate a bid and they are considered corporate actions; acts which result to 
an actual alteration of the company’s securities. They are defenses that require prior 
shareholder approval. This category of defenses includes several corporate 
restructuring methods, such as sale of crown jewels, privatization, defensive 
acquisition and liquidation (Johansson and Thortensson, 2008). The mechanism in 
which the stock of the company is altered and thus, the takeover bid is frustrated is 
examined below. 
 
To begin with, the crown jewels defense involves the sale of the most valuable assets 
of the target company (Zarin and Yang, 2011). In particular, the target company owns 
important and high valued assets and divisions. The bidder company has researched 
the target company, has identified these valuable assets and then commences a hostile 
takeover because it is interested in their acquisition. In response, the target company 
employs the crown jewels defense and sells its important assets and divisions to make 
the company less attractive to the bidder. Since the assets are no longer property of 
the target, the bid has been frustrated and the bidder is no longer interested in pursuing 
a hostile takeover for the acquisition of the target. 
 
The target company can sell its assets either to a third party or to a white knight (Zarin 
and Yang, 2011). The latter is a friendly company and gives the option to the target 
company to acquire back its shares at a price agreed beforehand when there is no 
longer the threat of a takeover. A ‘sale and lease-back agreement’ can also, be 
implemented in this case (Johansson and Thortensson, 2008). 
 
Although the crown jewels defense is an immediate response to a hostile takeover and 
can obstruct the bid, it is also associated with risks (Zarin and Yang, 2011). Firstly, 
the target company by selling its valuable assets, it might receive high amounts of 
cash in return. This might make the target company even more attractive towards the 
bidder, hence the purpose of the crown jewels will have been defeated. A solution 
could be to use the profit made to finance other takeover defenses, for instance special 
dividends to shareholders. Another risk is that if the target company decides to sell its 
assets to a friendly white knight, it has to be certain that it will buy them back. Detailed 
agreements should be drafted, stating the terms of the lease of the assets and their re-
acquisition price. 
 
Nonetheless, the crown jewels defense is a strategic and rapid response to an imminent 
takeover and its risks could be challenged by carefully drafted agreements and by 
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carefully employed techniques after the sale of the crown jewels. 
 
Furthermore, another method included under corporate restructuring defenses is 
privatization (Tachmatzidi, 2017). It involves the conversion of a public company to 
private and thus, its shares cannot longer be traded on the stock market as such 
(Johansson and Thortensson, 2008). This method is very successful because the 
directors can retain their positions and the shareholders make a profit from the 
premium received. However, to avoid unfair treatment and lawsuits from certain 
shareholders, the premium paid needs to reflect a considerable to the existing market 
price. 
 
There are two more corporate restructuring defenses that are used in situations of 
imminent takeovers; the defensive acquisition and liquidation (Johansson and 
Thortensson, 2008). The former involves actions that reduce borrowing, as well as 
exaggerations in cash balances. Liquidation is used as an ultimate corporate 
restructuring method and brings the company to an end, as it stops trading and its 
assets are liquidated. Additionally, this defense includes the creditors’ pay off as well 
as the ‘liquidation premium’ payment to the shareholders. Though, liquidation of the 
target company is employed only in situations where the liquidation premium paid is 
higher than the premium that the bidder offers (Johansson and Thortensson, 2008). 
 
Another takeover defense that requires prior shareholder approval is target repurchase 
or otherwise called ‘greenmail’ (Zarin and Yang, 2011) and involves the target 
company buying back its shares from the bidder company at a premium which is more 
than the price currently on the market (Shah, 1996). The premium is of significant 
nature and is paid in exchange of a standstill agreement. According to this agreement, 
the bidder is prohibited from acquiring shares from the target company for a specific 
time period. If such an agreement is not made, greenmail will not have any positive 
effect for the target company and the bidder will most likely make a takeover bid again 
(Johansson and Thortensson, 2008). The aim of the greenmail defense is to frustrate 
the bid with the ultimate result of obstructing a hostile takeover attempt (Stokka, 
2013). 
 
Greenmail is an effective defense against bidders that are interested in short-term 
profits. This is because bidders are induced from the high premium paid by the target 
company to re-acquire its shares (Zarin and Yang, 2011). In contrast, target 
repurchases are not very effective against bidders that aim for control of the target and 
long-term profits. 
 
A disadvantage of target repurchases used as takeover defenses is that they might 
create an agency problem (Shah, 1996). Since the aim of a company is increase of its 
wealth and the directors are acting as agents for the shareholders, the directors should 
perform actions that aim to increase shareholder profits. However, greenmailing 
benefits the directors since they manage to obstruct a takeover and retain their job 
positions. This theory is referred to as ‘Management Entrenchment’ (Engle, 2007).  
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In contrast, because the premium surpasses significantly the current market price 
(Johansson and Thortensson, 2008; Nenkov, 2016; Theriou, 2015; Lyasnikov et al., 
2017), target repurchases might not benefit the shareholders whom are not able to pay 
the premium price for the shares, resulting to unfair treatment (Hanly, 1992). Because 
directors are willing to pay an extremely high price to keep their jobs, some 
shareholders cannot afford it. Therefore, the interests of the directors might conflict 
with those of the shareholders, creating an agency problem. In any case, conflict of 
interest between managers and shareholders should not be an obstacle for the 
activation of greenmail defense (Engle, 2007). There are other governance and 
monitoring strategies shareholders can employ in order to protect the suppression of 
their own interests created by premium payment. 
 
The recent years there has been a decrease in usage of this takeover defense because 
of the tax imposed on capital gains and a few corporations have also, inserted 
provisions against greenmailing in the company’s constitution (Bruner, 2004). 
 
Restructuring defenses and target repurchases are considered as frustrating defenses 
because they can materially corrupt the decision-making process and can deprive from 
the shareholders the right to decide on the merits of the offer. Therefore, they are 
prohibited under Rule 21.1 (b) of the UK Takeover Code if there is no shareholder 
approval. Moreover, if these two defenses are taken without shareholder approval, 
they might be considered as a breach of fiduciary duty from the directors. Moreover, 
under the UK Listing Rules 10.5.1, shareholder approval may be required for major 
transactions. 
 
3.3 Litigation framework 
 
Takeover litigation is another possible frustrating defense the target board of directors 
might use, if it has obtained prior approval from the target shareholders. Tactical 
litigation, also called obstructive, is employed before a takeover contest, 
simultaneously with it, or after it, and it does not involve ruling on significant legal 
matters that have arisen between the claimant and the defendant (Ogowewo, 2007). It 
aims to impede or completely block a hostile takeover offer (Underhill and Austmann, 
2002). 
 
Litigation involves several actions such as, ‘restraining orders’, ‘legal injunctions’, 
‘antitrust litigations’ or ‘filling a law suit’ (Zarin and Yang, 2011). While the hostile 
bidder tries to prove that the takeover is legal, the board takes advantage of the time 
to adopt another defense and obstruct the bid. The board can also, negotiate with the 
bidder and make an agreement that the target shareholders will receive make higher 
profits from the takeover and in return, the target company will cease the litigation 
proceedings (Zarin and Yang, 2011). Furthermore, litigation as a defense might lead 
to the strengthening of the shareholders opposition towards the acceptance of the bid, 
since they might consider that the bidder has other motives than the ones shown and 
for instance, is only interested in the acquisition of the targets’ assets. Tactical 
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litigation can also, result to the hostile bidder disclosing the strategic plan that will be 
employed in a case of a successful takeover. If the plan is not in accordance with the 
targets’ plan, it can provide the board a strong defense against the bidder. 
 
Litigation could be brought as a defense before a Court. However, a body of case law 
discussed below, proves that Courts are unwilling to interfere with a takeover, thus 
the board will most likely not bring the case to the Court. The European, as well as 
the Competition Commissions could also, deal with tactical litigation (Stokka, 2013). 
Nevertheless, if the sole reason for referring it to the Commission is for the delay of 
the takeover process, it will not affect it significantly. 
 
The definition given by United Kingdom’s Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
is that tactical litigation is legal proceedings taken by bidding parties with the aim to 
frustrate or obstruct a takeover offer or a defense towards the offer (Department of 
Trade and Industry, 2005). However, there are two ways in which tactical litigation 
can be discussed; one in relation to Rule 21.1 of the UK Takeover Code and one that 
does not engage it (Ogowewo, 2007). As a result, there has been a debate whether 
litigation should be considered frustrating or not. According to Consolidated Gold 
Fields (The Takeover Panel [1989/7]), litigation will engage Rule 21.1 if the target 
board of directors is the one to commence litigation and the target shareholders will 
be frustrated as a result. This is based on both objective and subjective examinations 
and it usually involves a corruption in the decision-making process or a deprivation 
of the shareholders’ rights to decide on the takeover bid. Though, only the target board 
is responsible to follow the requirements of Rule 21.  
 
On the other hand, tactical litigation that does not engage Rule 21.1 is litigation that 
has received prior approval by the target shareholders and does not frustrate the target 
shareholders, such as the litigation that took place in Marks and Spencer Plc v 
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer ([2004] EWHC 1337, Ch.) case. Hence, tactical 
litigation can have both a frustrating and non- effect on the target shareholders 
depending on their prior authorization. 
 
A disadvantage of litigation is that there are costs associated with it (Ogowewo, 2007). 
Firstly, the hostile bidder suffers from delay costs from the underwritten shares, since 
the target board tries to delay the takeover process by using tactical litigation and since 
the cost from underwriting shares in the marketplace is based on the amount of time 
that these shares are underwritten. Other costs occurring due to tactical litigation are 
social costs that involve court and compliance costs, as well as costs relating to the 
justice system and the parties in the litigation case.  
 
Tactical litigation also, has a negative impact on the market for corporate control 
(Ogowewo, 2007). If the target board succeeds and the hostile bidder revokes the 
offer, the shareholders of the target company face a big amount of loss of profit. As a 
result, there is a decrease of the market’s disciplinary nature. Another disadvantage of 
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litigation is that it has not been proven efficient towards bidders that invest in the long-
run (Zarin and Yang, 2011). 
On the contrary, there have been studies that prove that tactical litigation is successful 
for the target company resisting a hostile takeover (Ogowewo, 2007). A study states 
that considering 45 hostile takeovers, most of them, in particular 39, where 
unsuccessful for the bidder due to the employment of litigation from the target, besides 
other defense strategies used (Ogowewo, 2007). The effectiveness of tactical litigation 
can also, be a maximization of the profit of the target shareholders (Ogowewo, 2007). 
This is because litigation produces delays to the takeover process and this allows other 
bids, which might be more profitable for the target, to be made. Studies have proven 
that more than 75% of companies that have employed litigation as a defense have been 
acquired for a much higher bid (Ogowewo, 2007). 
 
Despite the several costs that go along with tactical litigation, it is a technique that 
helps the target company delay the takeover process, thus creating a bidding contest 
and giving more time to the target for other defenses to be employed as well, often 
resulting to profit enhancement of the target board and shareholders. 
 
4. Defensive Actions 
 
4.1. Defense document framework 
 
Rule 25.1(a) of the UK Takeover Code requires the target company to issue a circular 
which is considered as a defense document when the takeover is hostile. This action 
needs to be done usually within 14 days of the announcement of the bid and it is issued 
to all target shareholders and people with information rights equally (Stokka, 2013). 
Furthermore, the pension scheme trustees and the representatives of the employees 
should also, have access to the circular (UK Takeover Code, Rule 25(1)(a)). 
According to Rule 25.2, the defense document must contain the target board opinion 
for the takeover offer, as well as the board’s view on the results the takeover offer will 
have if it occurred. It should also, include the strategic plan of the hostile bidder and 
the consequences it might have on the target company. Under Rule 25, the target board 
is required to distribute information equally to all the shareholders. 
 
There are some additional legal requirements that are needed to be complied with 
when the target board issues a defense document (Stokka, 2013). Rule 19 of the UK 
Takeover Code states that any published documents need to be drafted with due 
consideration and care. It requires that the documents need to be correctly and 
excellently drafted with a fair and sufficient presentation of all the relevant 
information. Notes to Rule 19.1 include more specifications such as responsibilities 
for financial advisers and requirements for sources, quotations, diagrams and other 
media usage. Another requirement is Rule 23.1, which states that the target 
shareholders have the right of access to adequate information in relation to the 
takeover offer, as well as advice in order to assist them to make an appropriate 
consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of the takeover offer. 
Isidora Tachmatzidi 
 
113 
 
An interesting case is the unsuccessful attempt of NASDAQ Stock Exchange to 
takeover London Stock Exchange (Brennan, 2010). There were two hostile bids made, 
but they were heavily fought. NASDAQ claimed that the defense document issued by 
LSE had misleading statements. However, LSE’s shareholders did not accept the 
takeover bid, as they were not convinced with the hostile bidders’ arguments and the 
takeover price of the second hostile bid was not increased compared to the first one. 
As a result, the hostile takeover was not successful. 
 
4.2. Lobbying framework 
 
Another defense strategy is that the board can use the competition authorities in order 
to lobby for appeal (Shearman and Sterling LLP, 2015/16). It can be employed by the 
board of directors and prior shareholder or panel approval is not required.  
 
The purpose is to notify the competition authorities and generally the marketplace 
about possible unfair competition matters (Kraakman, 2009). Furthermore, the board 
can lobby to the media and to financial analysts, which is crucial when a hostile 
takeover involves a foreign company attacking a national company because stronger 
support will be promoted for the national company through the media and the financial 
market (Stokka, 2013). Therefore, the board of directors tries to influence the 
shareholders, the relevant authorities, as well as the general public, that the takeover 
offer made by the bidder is not fair according to the standard rules of competition in 
the marketplace.  
 
In BAT Industries (The Takeover Panel [1989/20]), it was held that lobbying is not 
considered as frustrating action. Hoylake Investments Limited (“Hoylake”) made an 
offer to B.A.T. Industries p.l.c. (“BAT”) for the latters’ share capital. BAT also, 
owned indirectly Farmers Group Inc (“Farmers”), which was a US company, and 
since the offer included regulatory approvals, these needed to be also obtained by 
Farmers’ State of operation. There was extensive lobbying involved by BAT and 
Farmers in the United States and Hoylake claimed that the BAT board was frustrating 
the takeover bid through this process. 
 
However, the Panel stated that lobbying does not directly obstruct the takeover bid 
(The Takeover Panel [1989/20]). Additionally, counter lobbying is permitted, which 
proves that lobbying is a process that aims for both sides of the argument to be 
presented in order to make a considerate decision on the takeover offer. Therefore, it 
was held by the Panel that the actions by BAT and the Farmers of lobbying in the 
United States people of public influence such as politicians and others that can have 
an influence on the takeover offer did not frustrate that takeover bid. Nonetheless, it 
should be borne in mind that such extensive lobbying might not be consistent with the 
decision of the UK to opt for a mandatory board neutrality rule, thus if such extensive 
lobbying occurred in the UK, it might have been considered as frustrating (Ogowewo, 
2007). 
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4.3. Seeking alternative bids framework 
 
The target has an option to seek for alternative bidders which will be friendly and will 
cooperate with the current board of directors; White Knights and the White Squires 
(Stokka, 2013). These competing bidders are used as takeover defenses that do not 
require shareholder or panel approval for the target board to employ them. The reason 
is because they are not considered corporate actions, meaning that their usage does 
not result to an actual and material change in the company’s stock. Thus, they are not 
frustrating actions. 
 
To begin with the White Knight defense, it is considered a friendly, to the target, 
company or individual that is approached by the board of directors and requested to 
assist with the obstruction of an imminent hostile takeover by making a counter bid 
and defending the target company against the hostile bidder (Johansson & Thortnsson, 
2008). This bid has to out-bid the original offer of the hostile company for the threat 
of the hostile takeover to be removed. The justifications for using a White Knight vary 
from excellent previous cooperation with a company, friendly relations, mutual trust 
and negative stance towards dismissals (Zarin and Yang, 2011). Furthermore, the 
White Knight may be chosen because of the agreement on offer; the target company 
will not be divided, not sold separately and/or the board of directors will retain their 
jobs in the new company (Johansson and Thortensson, 2008). The White Knight 
defense is considered as one of the most effective strategy against hostile takeovers. 
 
Despite the benefits of using the White Knight as a takeover defense, there are risks 
and disadvantages associated with it (Johansson and Thortensson, 2008). Firstly, 
instead of keeping the independence of the target company, the White Knight takes 
control and overtakes the company (Zarin and Yang, 2011). This can lead to adverse 
to the purpose of the defense results. An example is ‘Lady Macbeth strategy’, which 
involves the White Knight acquiring the target company and later, selling the shares 
to the hostile bidder (Johansson and Thortensson, 2008). Thus, the target is eventually 
acquired by the hostile bidder due to the cooperation of the White Knight with the 
initial bidder. The risk stems from the basic problem of finding and cooperating with 
a trustworthy White Knight (Zarin and Yang, 2011). 
 
Another disadvantage is that the shareholders of the White Knight might be deprived 
from profits due to the pressured acquisition of the target company and the possible 
short-term only plan for management of the target company (Shah, 1996). The board 
of directors of the target might also, not be able to support a strong defense document, 
since it includes arguments in favor of the independency of the target, and the board 
is already seeking another bidder (Stokka, 2013).  
 
The White Squire is a similar defense to the White Knight, which involves a friendly 
company acquiring a significant block of shares from the target company, as opposed 
to the White Knight which the friendly company acquires the target (Johansson and 
Thortensson, 2008). This block of shares is called ‘corner’. By buying the corner in 
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the target, the White Squire has an important position in the company and has the 
power to vote against the hostile takeover. Hence, it cooperates with the target board 
and obstructs the imminent takeover. There are agreements signed which state 
requirements and benefits for each party involved; the White Squire might be 
prohibited from selling the acquired shares and in exchange, it is promised a position 
on the target board, a dividend or a reduced price on the block of shares. 
 
The White Squire defense faces similar problems to the White Knight defense that 
were mentioned earlier. Finding a trustworthy White Squire that will not reverse its 
role and help the hostile takeover is a difficult process. However, a White Squire can 
also, be produced through funds from institutions, for instance investments funds and 
banks, which are considered as important and helpful White Squires (Zarin and Yang, 
2011). 
 
The aforementioned defenses do not fall under Rule 21.1 of the UK Takeover Code, 
because they are not considered corporate actions; no alteration in the stock of the 
company occurs and the target shareholders are not deprived of their rights (Stokka, 
2013). Hence, the target board can employ them in a case of a hostile takeover. 
 
However, the target must comply with certain provisions of the UK Takeover Code 
in relation to disclosure requirements and competing bids when using this type of 
defenses (Stokka, 2013). Firstly, fair competition needs to be protected, thus Rule 20.2 
states that the target board has the duty, if requested, to give the same amount of 
information to the hostile bidder as the information given to the white knight. 
Secondly, there are requirements relating to competitive bidding contests, according 
to Rule 32.5; where bidding competition is still ongoing in offer’s subsequent phases, 
the final bid revisions need to be stated 46 days after the official announcement of the 
competing bid. However, offer revisions are allowed to be brought as a counter-offer 
to the aforementioned revision. 
  
4.4 Profit forecasts framework 
 
Profit forecasts are another way for the target board to influence the shareholders 
negatively against the takeover bid and they are regulated by Rule 28 of the UK 
Takeover Code. In particular, Rule 28.1(a) requires that if, without Panel consent, the 
target company issues a profit forecast, it needs to include a report from the targets’ 
accountants that the forecast has been issued according to the target’s official 
accounting procedures (UK Takeover Code, Rule 28.1(a)(i)). Another report from the 
targets’ financial advisers is also, required stating that the forecast was produced 
responsibly (UK Takeover Code, Rule 28.1(a)(ii)).  
 
Moreover, Rule 28(b) states the profit forecast to be repeated according to Rule 
28.1(a)(i) and (ii) requirements, if the target company had produced another forecast 
when it received a takeover bid but before the start of the offer period. If however, the 
target company had published a forecast before a takeover offer was made, any 
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document which was issued during the offer period and contained a reference to the 
forecast has certain requirements according to Rule 28.1(c). The document needs to 
repeat the forecast and contain directors’ confirmations in relation to the validity or 
the document to contain a director statement that the forecast is invalid and provide 
reasons or the document to contain a new forecast according to the requirements of 
Rule 28.1(a)(i) and (ii). 
 
‘Profit forecast’ encompasses a wide definition, because even if the word ‘profit’ is 
not mentioned or there is no figure stated, it can be included under Rule 28 as ‘profit 
forecasts (Ogowewo, 2003). Furthermore, Vantona Group Ltd/J. Compton, Sons & 
Webb (The Takeover Panel [1978/13]) held that it is not necessary for the statement 
made by the board to be during the offer period for it to be considered as a profit 
forecast. In Guinness plc/The Distillers Company plc ([The Takeover Panel 
[1986/11]) it was also, stated that if the person making the statement claims that it is 
not a profit forecast, his declaration is irrelevant; it is still treated as a forecast. 
 
It is crucial to regulate profit forecasts, because if there is a misleading statement, it 
could influence negatively the decision-making process of the target shareholders 
(Ogowewo, 2003). Consequently, it would be a frustrating action, thus prohibited by 
Rule 21.1. 
 
5. Conclusions, Proposals, Recommendations 
 
The UK has regulated takeovers and the relevant takeover defenses with the UK 
Takeover Code that has implemented the EU Takeover Directive via the UK 
Companies Act. The board of directors of the target company is able to employ 
takeover defenses in a potential hostile takeover. According to their characteristics, 
these defenses can either be frustrating or defensive actions and include defenses such 
as restructuring defenses, target repurchases, litigation, defense document strategy, 
lobbying, seeking alternative bids and profit forecasts.  
 
Since takeover defenses are heavily regulated in the UK economy, the directors and 
shareholders of both biding and target companies, usually are aware of what to expect 
regarding a possible takeover or takeover defenses respectively. Within this 
framework, the regulation of the economic processes and market structure avoids 
upsetting events and provides a secure economic environment.  
 
However, considering the Brexit processes, the present paper aimed to provide the 
existing framework of takeover defenses. There is a possibility for significant changes 
on the existing UK Takeover Code and an extensive consideration both in the United 
Kingdom and the European Union that may require extensive policy consideration 
and implementation. 
 
Takeovers and takeover defenses operate on an economic structure that has specific 
market characteristics. The European Union attempted to harmonize the economic 
Isidora Tachmatzidi 
 
117 
 
regulation and issued the relevant Directive on takeovers. Within this framework, 
takeover defenses are significantly affected by the structure of the economy in which 
they operate. It is suggested that future research could study the application of 
takeover defenses in economies of different structure or scale and examine the 
interplay of influence between economy and takeover defenses. 
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